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75 CaI.Rptr. 790 
In ro David Ollvor HAYES 
on Habeas Corpus. 
Cr. 11647. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
March 17, 1969. 
Proceeding on petition for writ of 
habeas corpus by a motorist who had been 
convicted of driving motor vehicle on a 
public street while his driving privilege 
had been suspended and while he was 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
The Supreme Court, Mosk, J., held that 
imposition of sentences for driving while 
license was suspended and driving while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
was not contrary to statute proscribing 
against infliction of multiple punishments 
for single criminal act or omission. 
Petition denied. 
Traynor, C. I., and Tobriner and Sul-
livan, JJ., dissented. 
Opinion 69 CaI.Rptr. 310, 442 P 2d 366, 
vacated. 
I. Criminal Law €=>1209 
Statute proscribing multiple punish. 
ment is not limited to provisions of Penal 
Code, but embraces penal provisions in 
other codes including those found in Ve-
hicle Code. West's Ann.Vehicle Code, §§ 
14601, 23lO2; West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 
654. 
2. Criminal Law ~1209 
Statute proscribing multiple punish-
ments refers not to any physical act or 
omission which might perchance be common 
to all of a defendant's violations, but to a 
defendant's criminal acts or omissions. 
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 654. 
3. CrimInal Law €=>1209 
Imposition of sentences for driving 
while license was suspended and driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor was not contrary to statute pro-
scribing against infliction of multiple 
punishments for single criminal act or 
omIssIon. West's Ann.Vehicle Code, §§ 
14601,23102; West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 654. 
4. CrimInal Law *'>1209 
Proximity in time between criminal 
acts does not preclude multiple punish-
ment under statute. West's Ann.Pen.Code, 
§ 654. 
5. Criminal Law *'>200(1) 
Statute's preclusion of multiple prose-
cution is separate and distinct from its 
preclusion of multiple punishment; and 
rule against multiple prosecutions is a pro-
cedural safeguard against harassment 
which is not necessarily related to punish-
ment to be imposed, and double prosecution 
may be precluded even when double punish-
ment is permissible. West's Ann.Pen.Code, 
§ 654. 
6. Criminal Law c&=>1209 
Statute proscribes multiple punish-
ment for single act or omission which is 
made punishable by different statutes, that 
is, a single criminal act or omission. West's 
Ann.Pen.Code, § 654. 
Kenneth M. Wells, Public Defender, and 
Charles G. Fredericks, Asst. Public De-
fender, for petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Doris H. 
Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edsel W. Haws 
and Arnold O. Overoye, Deputy Atty. Gen., 
for respondent. 
MOSK, Justice. 
On December 30, 1966, petitioner David 
Oliver Hayes drove a motor vehicle for 
some 13 blocks in violation of Vehic1e 
Code section 14601 (with knowledge of a 
suspended license) and Vehicle Code sec-
tion 23lO2 (while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor.) He pleaded guilty to 
and was sentenced for both offenses. Peti-
tioner now assen:s that imposition of sen-
tences for both violations is contrary to the 
proscription against multiple punishment 
contained in Penal Code section 654. We 
have concluded that petitioner's contention 
lacks merit. 
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[1] Section 654 provides that "An act fortunately, these formulae are of only 
or omission which is made punishable in limited utility in the instant case, and we 
different ways by. different provisions of therefore begin anew with a direct anaIy-
this Code niay be punished under either of sis of the statute and its application to the 
such provisions, but in no case can it be facts before us,1 
punished under more than one * • *." 
The interdiction is not limited to the pro-
visions of the Penal Code, but embraces 
penal provisions in :other codes as well, in-
cluding those found in the Vehic1e Code. 
(Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal. 
2d 11, 18 fn., I, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 
839; People v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711, 
204 P.2d 321.) 
The key to application of section 654 is 
in the phrase "act or omission": a de-
fendant may be punished only once for each 
distinct "act or omi~ision" committed. There 
have been numerotls attempts in the cases 
to define a single "act," with varying de-
grees of clarity. Section 654 has been held 
to apply, for example, where the multiple 
violations are "necessarily included of-
fenses" (People v. Knowles (l950) 35 Cal. 
2d 175, 186, 217 P.2d 1) and where there 
is a single "intent and objective" under-
lying a course of criminal conduct (Neal 
v. State of California (1960) supra, 55 
Cal.2d 11, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839) 
but not where there are mUltiple victims 
(id.). Most of the cases construing sec-
tion 654 can be resolved by application of 
one or the other of these theories. (See, 
e. g., In re Ford (1967) 66 Cal.2d 183, 57 
Cal.Rptr. 129, 424 P.2d 681 [kidnaping of 
three victims]; in re Ward (1966) 64 Cal. 
2d 672, 51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400 
[kidnaping with intent to rob and robbery] ; 
People v. Brown (1958) 49 Cal.2d 577, 320 
P.2d 5 [abortion and resulting death]; 
People v. Craig (1941) 17 Cal.2d 453, 110 
P.2d 403 [rape and statutory rape]; Peo-
ple v. Pater (1968) 267 A.C.A. 1027, 73 
CaI.Rptr. 823 [grand theft-auto and driv-
ing vehicle without owner's consent].) Un-
I. Our analysis herein is in no way in-
tended to preclude application of the 
above tests where appropriate, any more 
than those tests themselves are mutually 
exclusive. It is only because we find all 
the foregoing formulae inapplicable that 
[2] To put petitioner's entire adventure 
into a few words: he drove his car with 
an invalid license and while intoxicated. 
Initially, it is temptingly easy to extract, 
as petitioner urges us to do, the single act 
of "driving," obviously common to both of 
the charged offenses, and to apply section 
654 to this case on the theory that "driving" 
was petitioner's only uact or omission." 
However, to do so would be no more justi-
fied than to extract the act of "possession" 
from a charge of possessing two different 
items of contraband, an approach long re-
jected by our courts. (E. g., People v. 
Schroeder (1968) 264 A.C.A. 257, 267-268, 
70 Cal.Rptr. 491 [multiple punishment for 
simultaneous possession of various nar-
cotic drugs, not precluded by section 654]; 
People v. Lockwood (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 
75, 82-83, 61 CaI.Rptr. 131 [same]; People 
v. Lopez (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 344, 350-
351, 337 P.2d 570 [same]; People v. Man-
dell (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 93, 98-99, 202 P. 
2d 348 [same]; People v. Wasley (1966) 
245 CaI.App.2d 383, 53 Cal.Rptr. 877 [pos-
session of different illegal weapons]; d. 
People v. Schroeder, supra~ 264 A.C.A. at 
pp. 268-269, 70 CaLRptr. 491 [possession 
of single narcotic, a single offense]; Peo-
ple v. Branch (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 490, 
260 P.2d 27 [possession and sale of same 
narcotic].) We cannot overlook the 
crucial element: section 654 refers not to 
any physical act or omission which might 
perchance be common to all of a defend-
ant's violations, but to a defendant's crim-
inal acts or omissions. (See, e. g., In re 
Johnson (1966) 65 Cal.2d 393, 395, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 873, 420 P.2d 393; People v. Quinn 
(1964) 61 Cal.2d 551, 555, 39 Cal.Rptr. 
I 
we resort to the present approach. If 
under any of the enunciated tests the 
proscription of section 654 applies, a 
contrary result under another test is ir-
relevant. 
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393, 393 P.2d 705; People v. Brown (1958) 
supra, 49 CaI.2d 577, 590, 320 P.2d 5; 
People v. Branch, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d 
at p. 4%, 260 P.2d 27).2 Indeed, section 
654 itself makes this distinction evident, 
since it refers to an act or omission "made 
punishable" by different statutes.3 The 
neutral act of driving, like the mere act 
of possessing in the foregoing cases, when 
viewed in a vacuum, is not "made punish-
able" by any statute. 
[3] The proper approach, therefore, is 
to isolate the var~ous criminal acts in-
volved, and then to examine only those 
acts for identity. In the instant case the 
two criminal acts are (\) driving with a 
suspended license and (2) driving while 
intoxicated; they are in no sense identical 
or equivalent. Petitioner is not being 
punished twice-because he cannot be 
punished at all-for the "act of driving." 
He is being penalized once for his act of 
driving with an invalid license and once 
for his independent act of driving while 
intoxicated.4 
Moreover, we must not confuse simul-
taneity with identity: in both of the above 
situations-driving as in this case and pos-
2. The language in Johnson is typical: 
"The basic principle that forbids multi-
ple punishment for one criminal act 
[citations] precludes infliction of more 
than one punishment for [a] series of 
acts directed toward one criminal objec-
tive * * *." (Italics added.) (65 
Cal.2d at p. 395. 54 Cal.Rptr. at p. 874. 
420 P.2d at p. 394 (per Traynor, C. 
J.).) 
3. Compare former section 1938 of the 
New York Penal Law. referred to in 
Neal as "identical with" section 654, 
which uses the specific language. ".An 
act or omission which is made criminal 
and punishable * * *." (Italics add-
ed.) 
4. On the ·other hand, the single criminal 
act of driving 'with knowledge of an in-
valid license is arguably "made punisha-
ble" by both Vehicle Code section 14601 
(driving with a suspended or revoked 
license) and Vehicle Code section 12500 
(unlicensed driving); and section 654 
would therefore preclude multiple pun-
ishment under both sections. 
session of contraband in the cited cases-
the defendant committed two simultaneous 
criminal acts, which coincidentally had in 
common an identical noncriminal act. The 
two simultaneous criminal acts of possess-
ing substance X and possessing substance 
Y share the common, "neutral" act of 
possessing, just as they necessarily share 
the common factor of lack of a valid pre-
scription for the drugs. Likewise, the two 
simultaneous-but distinct--criminal acts 
of driving with a suspended license and 
driving while intoxicated share the com-
mon, noncriminal act of driving.5 On the 
date in question petitioner's act of driving 
was criminal and simultaneously violated 
two statutes because and only because of 
the presence of both the unrelated ac-
companying acts of voluntary intoxication 
and knowing possession of a suspended 
license. Similarly, for example, if an in-
dividual went for a walk in possession of 
a loaded gun while he was intoxicated and 
unclothed, he would by the single neutral 
act of walking-or, more accurately, being 
in a "public place"-simultaneously violate 
three separate and unrelated statutes. (Pen. 
Code, §§ 12031, subd. (a); 647, subd. (f); 
314.) 6 Those three statutes, however, 
5. As a further illustration of the analogy: 
Petitioner could be said to have driven 
in possession of a suspended license and 
in "possession" (in his system) of intoxi-
cating liquor. Again, possession is the 
neutral or noncriminal identical factor; 
but the criminal acts are distinctive. 
6. Petitioner attaches significance to the 
fact that driving was an essential ele-
ment in both of his offenses, citing a 
statement first made in In re Chapman 
(1954) 43 Cal.2d 385, 390, 273 P.2d 
817. 819: "It is only when the two of-
fenses are committed by the 8ame act or 
when that act is e88ential to both that 
they may not both be punished." (Ital-
ics added.) Aside from the dubious 
vitality of this dictum (see People v. 
Collin. (1963) 220 CaI.App.2d 563, 579, 
83 Cal.Rptr. 638). "essentiality" in and 
of itself was and is not a sufficient test 
of the applicability of section 654. On 
closer scrutiny. in fact, the quoted state-
ment itself presupposes the existence of 
a single ("same") act; and we have 
seen that the only single acts that are 
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would be violated not by the one, noncrim-
inal act of being ill a public place but 
necessarily by three simultaneous though 
separate criminal acts. Once again, we 
must distinguish idetl·tical noncriminal acts 
from simultaneous criminal acts umade 
punishable" by law." 
[4] In attempting to equate simultan-
eity with identity, petitioner argues that 
"There was no evid€~nce his driving with-
out a license precedl~d the commencement 
of the driving while under. the influence." 
Thus if petitioner had begun driving while 
intoxicated at 11 :50 p. m., and at midnight 
his license had expired but he had con-
tinued to drive, he apparently would con-
cede that he could be punished for the 
two distinct acts of driving while intoxicat-
ed (before midnight) and driving with an 
expired license (after midnight). This 
arbitrary and wholly artificial distinction 
is unpersuasive. While separation in time 
may, in some contexts, make the legal 
separation of acts mc're apparent (see, e. g., 
In re Ward (1%6) supra, 64 Ca1.2d 672, 
678,51 Ca1.Rptr. Z72, 414 P.2d 400; Seiterle 
v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Ca1.2d 397, 
401-403, 20 Ca1.Rptr. I, 369 P.2d 697; 
People v. Howell (1%6) 245 Cal.App.2d 
787, 792, 54 Ca1.Rptr. 92), the converse 
does not necessarily follow. Proximity in 
relevant for purposes of section 654 are 
criminal acts. In the example suggested 
above, none of the hypothetical acts is a 
crime if committed in private; thus be-
ing or walking in a public place, like 
driving in the instant case or like pos-
session and lack of a prescription in tbe 
narcotics example, is a necessary element 
in ,all three crimes.. Yet this fact does 
not make those neurral elements in them-
selves punishable or criminal, for none 
is by itself a complete criminal act. 
Thus the fortuitou:~ identity of "essen-
tial" neutral elements remains irrelevant 
for our purposes. 
7. To the possession and driving examples 
might well be added. the cases which per-
mit multiple punishment where f:l single 
criminal act has more than one victim. 
(See Neal v. State of California (1960) 
supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 20-21, 9 Ca1.Rptr. 
607, 357 P.2d 839, and cases therein cit-
ed.) There might, for example, be one 
common act of shooting a gun, but dis-
451 P.2d-2B 
time between criminal events does not pre-
clude mUltiple punishment (People v. Slo-
bodian (1948) 31 Cal.2d 555, 191 P.2d 1); 
and petitioner's acts were neither more nor 
less multiple because of the fortuitous fact 
that they were completely, rather than only 
partly, simultaneous. (People v. Wasley 
(1%6) supra, 245 Ca1.App.2d 383, 387, 53 
Ca1.Rptr. 877.)8 
Nor can we subscribe to a contention 
that because petitioner may have had only 
one "intent and objective"--driving-when 
he committed the two violations, he .comes 
within the ambit of the test established in 
Neal v. State of California (1%0) supra, 
55 Ca1.2d 11,9 Ca1.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839. 
In Neal, the defendant had attempted mur-
der by means of arson (burning down the 
victims' house by igniting gasoline therein). 
We viewed that circumstance as an indi-
visible "course of criminal conduct," the 
criminal act of arson being only the means 
toward an ultimate criminal objective of 
murder. We stated that where there was 
only a single Hintent and objective" in-
volved in such a course of criminal con-
duct, section 654 precluded multiple punish-
ment. 
Here neither of the two violations can 
realistically be viewed as a "means" toward 
tinct criminal acts of killing victim X 
and killing victim Y. However, as we 
indicated in Neal, this particular test 
takes in additional considerations, such 
as degree of culpability, which might 
be inappropriate to apply in other con-
texts. 
8. The Attorney General, in apparent an-
swer to petitioner's argument, has made a 
belated attempt to establish that peti· 
tioner may have been observed by the 
arresting officer at two different times, 
so that technically the offenses charged 
were not "simultaneous." It is just such 
strained rationale that a test dependent 
on simultaneity would engender. As 
stated in People v. Pater (1968) supra, 
267 A.C.A. 1027, 1033. 73 Cal.Rptr. 
823, a "necessarily included offense" 
case, UN either clocks, calendars nor coun-
ty boundaries convert one continuing 
course of conduct into a series of crim-
inal acts." 
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the other and as such a part of a single 
course of criminal conduct, in the sense 
that the arSOn in Neal was committed not 
to burn property but only as a means to-
ward the single objective of murder. More-
over, the petitioner's intent and objective 
to drive from one place to another is no 
more relevant to our analysis than what he 
intended to do when he arrived there. (See 
In reWard (1966) supra, 64 Ca1.2d 672, 
676, 51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400.) Just 
as it is the criminal "act or omission" to 
which section 654 refers, it is the criminal 
"intent and objective" that we established 
as the test in Neal. (E. g., In re Johnson 
(1966) supra, 65 Cal.2d 393, 395, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 873, 420 P.2d 393 [intent to sell 
heroin]; In re Ward (1966) supra, 64 
Cal.2d 672, 676, 51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 
400 [intent to rob].) In Neal we found to 
be crucial not the defendant's possible 
intent and objective to acquire money, to 
gain revenge or to ignite gasoline, but only 
his intent and objective to commit murder.9 
Although the absence of a single intent and 
objective does not necessarily preclude ap-
plication of section 654 (see fn. 1, ante), 
it is clear that under the instant circum-
stances this test of Neal cannot be of aid 
to defendant. 
[5] Petitioner relies heavily upon People 
v. Morris (1%5) 237 Cal.App.2d 773, 47 
Ca1.Rptr. 253, which in a similar factual 
situation declared that section 654 proscrib-
ed multiple prosecutions for drunk driving 
9. Thus had the defendant there had the 
completelY independent criminal objec-
tives of murder (perhaps for vengeance) 
and burning the bouse (to collect fire in-
surance). or had he attempted to kill his 
victims with a gun and then set fire to 
their house as an afterthought. he would 
have been punishable for both arson and 
attempted murder. (See People v. Mas-
sie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 908, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 733. 428 P.2d 869; Seiterle v. 
Superior Court (1962) supra, 57 Cal. 
2d 397, 401, 20 Cal.Rptr. 1, 369 P.2d 
697.) 
10. A majority of the Morris court. given 
substantially the same argument pre-
sented to us, rejected the "criminal act" 
and an invalid license.tO As we pointed out 
in Neal~ however, "Section 654's preclusion 
of multiple prosecution is separate and 
distinct from its preclusion of multiple 
punishment. The rule against multiple 
prosecutions is a procedural safeguard 
against harassment and is not necessarily 
related to the punishment to be imposed; 
double prosecution may be precluded even 
'When double punishment is permissible." 
(Italics added.) Neal v. State of California 
(1960) supra, 55 Ca1.2d 11, 21, 9 Ca1.Rptr. 
607, 612, 357 P.2d 839, 844. Therefore 
we need not reexamine at this time the 
validity of the conclusions in Morris as to 
multiple prosecutions, other than to observe 
that they are disapproved to the extent they 
might relate to a multiple punishment prob-
lem. l1 
[6] In summation, then. section 654 of 
the Penal Code proscribes multiple punish-
ment for a single "act or omission which is 
made punishable" by different statutes, i. e., 
a single criminal act or omission. Since the 
mere act of driving is made punishable by 
no statute, it is not the type of act or omis-
sion referred to in section 654. The acts 
"made punishable" which this petitioner 
committed were (1) driving with a sus-
pended license and (2) driving while intoxi-
cated. two separate and distinct criminal 
acts; that they were committed simultan-
eOllsly and that they share in common the 
neutral noncriminal act of driving does not 
render petitioner's punishment for both 
definition for section 654 and appeared 
to apply the Ohapman test of "essen-
tiality." (But see dissent by _Whelan. 
J., id., p. 777, 47 Cal.Rptr. 253.) 
II. We note that even where the issue is 
multiple prosecution, the provisions of 
section 654 cannot be employed to mislead 
the court. Thus if a greater violation is 
concealed in order to gain "immunity" 
by prosecution for a lesser crime. section 
654 will not apply. (Kellett v. Superior 
Court (1966) 63 C.1.2d 822, 827-828, 
48 Cal.Rptr. 366, oW9 P.2d 206; Gail v. 
Municipal Court (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 
1005. 60 Cal.Rptr. 91; Hampton v. Mu-
nicipal Court (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 689. 
M C.l.Rptr. 760.) 
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crimes in conflict with Penal Code section punished only once for that act, since the 
654. "one act of inflicting force with the bat 
The order to show cause is discharged, cannot both be punished as assault with a 
and the petition for writ of habeas corpus deadly weapon and availed of by the 
is denied. People as the force necessary to constitute 
the crime of robbery." Although the act of 
McCOMB, PETERS and BURKE, JJ., striking the victim was not by itself made 
conCUT. punishable by different provisions of the 
Penal Code, it nevertheless fell within 
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. 
Section 654 of the Penal Code provides 
that "An act or omission which is made 
punishable in different ways by different 
provisions of this c:ode may be punished 
under either of such provisions, but in no 
case can it be punished under more than 
one." Underlying this deceptively simple 
language is a legislative determination that 
essential1y unitary c:riminal activity shall 
not be punished more than once regardless 
of how many distinct crimes it may com-
prise. The statute "has been applied not 
only where there was but one 'act' in the 
ordinary sense * :+ * but also where a 
course of conduct violated more than one 
statute and the problem was whether it 
comprised a divisible transaction which 
could be punished under more than one 
statute within the meaning of section 65 .. 1.." 
(People v. Brown (1958) 49 Cal.2d 577, 
591, 320 P.2d 5, 14 .. ) Since its application 
is not limited to cases in which the identical 
conduct violates two statutes or one of-
fense is necessarily :inc1uded in the other 1 
(Neal v. Stite of California (1960) 55 
Cal.2d 11, 18, 9 CaU;:ptr. 607, 611, 357 P.2d 
839, 843, and cases cited), the words ail 
"act ... ... '" made! punishable '" ... '" 
'by different provisions" do not refer to 
the entire criminal t::onduct proscribed by 
each provision but to conduct significantly 
common to both. 
Thus, in People v. Logan (1953) 41 Cal. 
2d 279, 290, 260 P.2d 20, 26, we held that a 
defendant who committed robbery by strik-
ing his victim with a. baseball bat could be 
I. For example, a single act of statutory 
rape would in every case also constitute 
contributing to th·e delinquency of a 
minor, and the laUer offense is there-
section 654 because it was an essential 
element of both the robbery and the assault. 
(In re Chapman (1954) 43 Cal.2d 385, 389, 
273 P.2d 817.) 
Moreover, there is no requirement that 
the act common to both crimes be punish-
able before section 654 comes into play. In 
Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal. 
2d 11, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839, the act 
common to both crimes was the act, not 
punishable by itself, of throwing lighted 
gasoline. It was made punishable as arson 
because the gasoline was thrown into a 
house and as attempted murder because it 
was thrown onto human beings. Since it 
"is the singleness of the act and not of the 
offense that is determinative" (People v. 
Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 187, 217 
P.2d I, 8), Neal could not be punished for 
both of those crimes. In People v. Craig 
(1941) 17 Cal.2d 453, 458, 110 P.2d 403, 
the act common to both statutory and forci-
ble rape was the act, innocent by itself, 
of sexual intercourse.. (See In re Lane 
(1962) 58 Ca1.2d 99, 104, 22 Cal.Rptr. 857, 
372 P.2d 897.) Although the additional 
elements of the force used and the age of 
the victim made the act punishable under 
different subdivisions of section 261 of the 
Penal Code, the defendant could be punish-
ed only once. 
The foregoing cases control this case, for 
petitioner's single act of driving was an 
essential element, indeed the only active 
element, of the two crimes charged, namely 
driving with knowledge that his driving 
privilege was suspended (Veh.Code § 
14601) and driving while under the in-
fore necessarily included in the former. 
(People v. Greer (1947) 30 CaI.2d 589, 
597-598, 184 P.2d 512.) 
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fluence of intoxicating liquor. (Veh.Code, 
§ 23102.) 
Cases involving simultaneous possession 
of different items of contraband are ob-
viously not to the contrary (e. g., People v. 
Schroeder (1968) 264 A.CA. 257, 267-268, 
70 Cal.Rptr. 491 [multiple punishment for 
simultaneous possession of various narcotic 
drugs, no~ precluded by section 654]; 
People v. Lockwood (1%7) 253 Cal.App.2d 
75, 82-33, 61 Cal.Rptr. 131 [same]; People 
v. Lopez (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 344, 350-
351,337 P.2d 570 [same]; People v. Man-
dell (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 93, 98-99, 202 P. 
2d 348 [same]; People v. Wasley (1966) 
245 Cal.App.2d 383, 387, 53 Cal.Rptr. 877 
[possession of different illegal weapons] j 
C£. People v. Schroeder, supra, 264 A.CA. 
at pp. 268-269, 70 Cal.Rptr. 491 [possession 
of single narcotic a single offense]; People 
v. Branch (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 490, 495-
4%, 260 P.2d 27 [possession and sale of 
same narcotic]), for the possession of one 
item is not essential to the possession of an-
other separate item. One does not possess 
in the abstract; possession is meaningless 
unless something is possessed. The pos-
session of each separate item is therefore 
a separate act of possession. 
Of course, had petitioner been convicted 
of a "crime" of being intoxicated and a 
"crime" of knowing that his driving priv-
ilege was suspended, the possession cases 
would be in point, and section 654 would 
not preclude punishing petitioner for both 
offenses even though he committed them 
simultaneously, In such a case there would 
2. Both Winchell and Was1ev correctly 
upheld dual sentences for simultaneous 
but different "acts." In Winchell the 
defendant simultaneously violated Penal 
Code section 12021, forbidding possession 
by an ex-convict of a pistol capable of 
being concealed on his person, and Penal 
Code section 466, forbidding possession 
of "a picklock, crow, keybit, or other 
instrument or tool with intent felonious-
ly to break or cnter into any building." 
In Wa.'flev the defendant simultaneous-
ly violated section 12021, proscribing pos-
session of a concealable pistol by an ex-
convict, and section 12020, proscribing 
possession of a sawed-off shotgun by "any 
be no act of petitioner common to the two 
crimes. Petitioner, however, was not con-
victed of being intoxicated and knowing 
that his driving privilege was suspended 
but of a single act of driving while intoxi-
cated and while his driving privilege was 
suspended. It is the singleness of that act 
that is determinative. 
The Attorney General contends, however, 
that Vehicle Code sections 14601 and 23102 
have different public purposes directed at 
distinct evils, and that the driver who vio-
lates both statutes simultaneously should 
be doubly punished because he is invading 
two social interests that the Legislature had 
designated for distinct protection by the 
enactment of two different statutes. In 
a jurisdiction without a multiple punish-
ment rule like that of Penal Code section 
654, this "distinct evil" test might aid the 
courts in ascertaining whether the Legisla-
ture intended cumulative punishments for 
simultaneous violations of statutes like 
Vehicle Code sections 14601 and 23102. 
(See Twice in Jeopardy (1965) 75 Yale L.J. 
262, 320; Kirchheimer, The Act, the Of-
fense, and Double Jeopardy (1949) 58 Yale 
L.J. 513, 523.) In California, however, 
when the rule of section 654 precluding 
multiple punishment applies, the courts can-
not invoke the "distinct evil" test to evade 
that statutory rule. (But see People v. 
Winchell (1967) 248 Ca1.App.2d 580, 596, 
56 Cal.Rptr. 782; People v. Wasley, supra, 
245 Ca1.App.2d 383, 386, 53 Ca1.Rptr. 877; 
People v. Poe (1965) 236 Ca1.App.2d Supp. 
928, 942, 47 Ca1.Rptr. 670.) • 
person." The decisions mention the dif-
ferent public purposes served by the two 
statutes violated by the respective de-
fendants, but they do not purport to an-
nounce a "distinct evils" test contrary 
to section 654. 
Since possession of a physical object 
is an "act" within the menning of sec-
tion 654, the defendant who possesses 
two different kinds of contraband in vio-
lation of two different statutes is com-
mitting two different "acts" of proscribed 
possession. 
The Poe cuse, supra, 236 Cal.App. 
2d Supp. 928, 942, 47 Cal.Rptr. 670, un-
like Winchell and Wasley, decided the 
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Moreover, any notio-n that' a California The Attorney General contends that mul-
court can multiply sentences because de- tiple punishment should be allowed in ac-
fendant's single act violates statutes that, cord with the statement in Neal v. State of 
in the court's 'vievl, vindicate different California, supra, 55 Ca1.2d 11, 20, 9 Cal. 
societal interests should have been dispelled Rptr. 607, 61Z, 357 P.Zd 839, 844, that "the 
by decisions such hs People v. BroWn, supra, purpose of the protection against multiple 
49 Ca1.2d 577, 590, :320 P.2d 5 (defendant punishment is to insure that the defendant's 
cannot be sentenced hoth for criminal abor-
tion and for murder caused by the same 
act), and People v. Craig, supra, 17 Ca1.2d 
453, 457, 110 P.Zd 403 (defendant cannot 
be sentenced for, both statutory rape and 
forcible rape committed by one act of 
intercourse forced upon a 16-year-old girl; 
compare People v. McCollum (1931) 116 
Ca1.App. 55, 58, 2 P.2d 432, a prosecution 
for both statutory rape and incest resulting 
from defendant's one act of intercourse 
with his 16-year-old daughter; the trial 
court correctly anti,:ipated the Craig de-
cisio!l, but the appellc~te court withheld judg-
ment on the question). 
double punishment issue erroneously and 
should therefore be disapproved. In Poe 
precisely the same conduct of the de-
fendants was n. trespass proscribed by 
Penal Code section 602, subdivision 
(j), and a contempt proscribed by Penal 
Code section 166, subdivision 4. The ap-
pellate court upheld dual sentences for 
this single "ace' 011 the theory that the 
trespass was a crime against property 
whereas contempt was a crime against 
the authority' of the superior court. 
3. It is a legislBt~ve, not n judicinl, func-
tion to fix the i extent of punishment that 
can be imposed II for any particular crime 
or group of eriml~s. Subject only to 
constitutional liinitations, the Legislature 
can define crimes und set their punish-
ments as it sees :rit. (Bell v. United 
States (1955) 349 U.S. 81, 82, 75 S.Ot. 
620, 99 L.Ed. 905; ,People v. Knowles 
(1950) 35 Cal.~d 175, 181, 217 P.2d 1; 
In re Rosencrantz (1928) 205 Cal. 534, 
587-538, 271 P; 902.) The courts can-
not impose c~~in:'ll penalties ,for con-
duct that the ,~gisIature hM not made 
punishable (U~!ted States v. Wilt berger 
(1820) 5 Wbea . 76, 93, 18 U.S. 76, 93. 
5 L.Ed. 37: Matter of Ellsworth (1913) 
165 Cal. 677" ~1, 133 P. 272; Have-
meyer v. Superior Court (1890) 84 Cal. 
327, 376. 24P. 121, 10 L.R.A. 627; 
Pen. Code. § 15j or adjudge punishment 
in excess of that aUlthorized by the Legis-
lature. (People: v. Lein ·(1928) 204 Cal. 
84, 87, 266 P; 5:16; People v. Riley 
punishment will be commensurate with his 
criminal liability." The Neal opinion made 
the quoted statement in the course of an 
inquiry into legislative purpose 3 with re-
spect to the extent of punishment of a de-
fendant who criminally injures or kills 
more than one victim. In holding that sec-
tion 654 does not forbid the separate pun-
ishment of a defendant's multiple crimes 
of violence that harm multiple victims, even 
though a single physical movement of the 
defendant is the one common cause ,of in-
juries or deaths of the several victims, 
Neal speaks of the multiple victim problem 
in terms of culpability 4 and consequences.1S 
(1874) 48 Cal. 549; In re Rye (1957) 
152 Cal.App.2d 594. 596, 313 P.2d 914; 
In re Carmignani (1925) 71 Cal.App. 
632, 633, 235 P. 1033.) The Legislature 
can and does command multiple punish-
ments for some crimes (e. g., Pen.Code, 
n 67. 68. 98 [disqualification from or 
forfeiture of office in addition to any 
other punishment for .certain offenses]) 
and it authorizes the courts in their dis-
cretion to impose multiple punishments 
for others (e. g., the familiar statutory 
provision that a crime is punishable by 
imprisonment, fine, or both). The Legis-
lature could also, if it saw fit to do so, 
expressly command or authorize mUltiple 
sentences for a group of crimes, however 
closely they might be related. Instead, 
the California Legislature, so far as 
multiple sentences for related crimes are 
concerned. has seen fit to enact the gen-
eral multiple punishment preclusion of 
section 654. 
4. "A defendant who commits an act of 
violence with the intent to harm more 
than one person or by a means likely 
to cause harm to several persons is more 
culpable than a defendant who harms 
only one person." (55 Cal.2d at p. 20, 
9 Cal.Rptr. at p. 612, 357 P.2d at p. 
844.) 
5. "Section 654 is not '* * * applica-
ble where * * * one net has two 
results each of which is a1'1 act of vio-
lence against the person of a separate 
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Moreover, under the orthodox theory of 
crime on which the Legislature based the 
Penal Code, the act of killing A is essential-
ly distinct fro"m the act of killing Beven 
when a single muscular contraction of the 
defendant is the common cause of both 
deaths. The concept of punishment "com-
mensurate with his criminal liability," used 
in Neal as an aid to the determination of 
legislative purpose in a multiple victim 
case, cannot be wrenched from that con-
text and invoked in the present case to 
justify ignoring the controlling precedents 
upon which the court in Neal relied in 
holding that Neal could not be punished 
both for arson and attempted murder. 
The Attorney General 'also contends that 
petitioner's uninterrupted and factually 
indivisible course of driving (see People 
individual.'" (55 Cal.2d at pp. 20-21, 
9 CnI.Rptr. at p. 612, 357 P.2d nt p. 
844, quoting from People v. Brannon 
(1924) 70 Cnl.App. 225, 235-236, 283 
P.88.) 
6. The Neal opinion stated its "intent and 
objective" test immediately after it had 
quoted from People v. Brown, supra, 49 
Cal.2d 577, 591. 320 P.2d 5. 14. the com· 
ment thnt "Section 654 hus been ap-
plied not only where there was but one 
'set' in the ordinary sense * * * but 
also where a course of conduct violated 
more than one statute and the prob-
lem was whether it comprised a divisible 
transaction which could be punished un-
der more than one statute within the 
meaning of section 654." 
Neither Neal nor Brown presented any 
question of a "divisible" transaction. In 
each of those cases one factually indivisi-
ble act was a common element of defend-
ant's violation of two statutes. In Neal 
the defendant threw and ignited gasoline 
with intent to and did commit both 
arson and attempted murder. In Brown 
the defendant's act that was intended 
to abort L also killed her. In both cases 
section 654 forbade sentencing the defend-
ant for the two crimes committed by the 
one act, and there was no occasion to 
inquire whether his offenses were or were 
not "incident to one objective." 
Other decisions cited in Neal and 
Brown, however, show that Neal's "in-
tent and objective" test should guide the 
sentencing judge in cases presenting a 
"course of action" or Htransaction" that, 
by oversubtle division of the evidence 
v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711, 715, 204 
P.2d 321) can be split to permit multiple 
sentencing by application of the Neal "in-
tent and objective" test (55 Cal.2d at p. 19, 
9 Cal.Rptr. at p. 611, 357 P.2d at p. 843) : 
UWhether a course of criminal conduct is 
divisible and therefore gives rise to more 
than one act within the meaning of section 
654 depends on the intent and objective 
of the actor. If all of the offenses were 
incident to one objective, the defendant may 
be punished for anyone of such offenses 
but not for more than one." That test was 
not designed to permit multiple sentencing 
that section 654 clearly forbids but to pre-
clude improper multiplication of sentences 
when there is at least some arguable ques-
tion as to the factual divisibility of defend-
ant's course of criminal conduct.s 
of acts and intents, could be split into 
a series of discrete crimes proscribed 
by different statutes directed against 
basically the same kind of criminality. 
(See, e. g., People v. Kehoe, supra, 33 Cal. 
2d 711, 713, 715, 204 P.2d 321 : People 
v. Greer, supra, 30 Cal.2d 589, 603, 184 
P.2d 512; compare People v. Slobodian 
(1948) 31 Cal.2d 555, 562, 191 P .2d 1.) 
In such cases the sentencing court is 
confronted with a state of facts that may 
or may not come within "the meaning of 
section 654" in the sense that, although 
section 654 does not give a comprehen-
sive or definitive rule enabling the solu-
tion of all multiple sentencing prob-
lems, it does indicate a general legislative 
purpose of lenity so far as the multiplica-
tion of sentences is concerned. Some-
times (as in Greer) the statutes defining 
the separate crimes in themselves will en-
able the court to ascertain the legisla-
tive purpose that they should not be 
separately punished, without resort to 
section 654. If, however, there remains a 
doubt as to the legislative purpose con-
cerning the multiplication of sentences, 
the doubt should be resolved in favor of 
lenity. (In re Tartar (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 
250, 257, 339 P.2d 553: People v. Ralph 
(1944) 24 Cal.2d 575,581, 150 P.2d 401; 
see In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 
744-745, 4R Cnl.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 
948.) In this class of caSes "the mean-
ing of section 654" and the "intent and 
objective" test direct the courts toward 
lenity in the same way that a judicial1Y 
recognized "baste principle that forbids 
multiple punishment for one criminal act" 
INREHAYES Cal. 439 
Cite 8S 451 P.2d 430 
There is no such arguable question in of the defendant's intent and objective as 
this case. Even if th,erc were, Neal would determinative just as it is wholly anomalous 
support petitioner, for he had only the to seize on the innocence of the act common 
single intent and oje(:tive to get from one to both crimes as determinative. It is a 
place to another. Th(~re is nothing in Neal strange inversion that a defendant who 
to indicate that the intent and objective of commits an act that is the essential and 
the defendant must he criminal before it 
may be deemed relevant in determining 
whether a course of criminal conduct .is 
not divisible So as to give rise to no mor~ 
than one act within the meaning of section 
654. Although the Neal case and the cases 
following it involved criminal intents and 
objectives (see cases cited in footnote 6, 
supra), that fact is not controlling. It is 
wholly anomalous to seize on the innocence 
forbids splitting a course of conduct into 
multiple violations {If the sume statute 
whenever there is El doubt os to the 
propriety of such frllgmcntation. (In re 
Johnson (1966) 65 Cal.2d 393, 393, 04 
Cal.Rptr. 873, 420 P.2d 393.) 
Neartt "intent and objcctivc" test also 
governs sentencing in cases of multiple 
convictions for both nn inchoate crime 
(e. g., burglary, conspiracy, solicitation, 
and like offenses that in fact and by def-
inition are committ.oxI not ns ends in 
themselves but as preparation for the 
consummation of a further criminal pur-
pose) and substanthe crimes committed 
in execution of tbfl inchoate purpose. 
There may be no single external "act" 
necessarily common to the preparatory 
offense Rnd the ultimate offense to bring 
the CRse precisely within the preclUsion 
of section 654, but by applicntion of the 
I·intent and objective" test the legisla-
tive purpose exprem;:ed by that section 
is effected. Illustrating this application 
of Neal are People v. l\IcFarlnnd (1962) 
58 Ca1.2d 748, 760-762, 26 Cal.Rptr. 
473, 376 P.2d 449 (burglary with intent 
to commit larceny and the larceny); Pco-
crucial element of two crimes can be pun-
ished twice if that act by itself is i;mocent 
or the defendant's intent and objective are 
innocent but can be punished only once if 
the common act or the intent and objective 
are criminal. 
TOBRINER and SULLIVAN, JJ.. con-
cur. 
pIe v. Hicks (1965) 63 Cal.2d 764, 765-
766, 48 Cal.Rptr. 139, 408 P.2d 747 
(burglary with intent to commit sexual 
felonies and the consummated sex, of-
fenscs); In re McGrew (1967) 66 Cal. 
2d 685, 688, 68 Cal.Rptr. 561, 427 P.2d 
161 (same); In re Cruz (1966) 64 Cal. 
2d 178, 180-181, 49 Cal.Rptr. 289, 410 
P.2d 825 (conspiracy to commit grand 
theft and grand theft); In re Romano 
(1966) 64 Cal.2d 826, 828, 51 Cal.Rptr. 
910, 415 P.2d 798 (conspiracy, burglary, 
and theft); In re Pratt (1967) 66 Cal. 
2d 104, 156, 56 Cal.Rptr. 895, 424 P.2d 
335 (kidnaping for the purpose of rob-
bery and robbery); In rc Malloy (1967) 
66 Cal.2d 252, 256, 57 Cal.Rptr. 345, 424 
P.2d 929 (same). Examllics need not 
be multiplied; the principle is plain. 
(Sce Twice in .Jeopardy (19G5) supra, 65 
Yale L.J. 262, 319; Kirchheimer, The 
Act, the Offense, and Double .Jeopardy 
(1949) supra, 58 Yale L.J. 513, 518; 
ALI Model Penal Code Proposed Of-
ficial Draft (1962) § 1.07(1) (b), and 
Tent. Draft No.5 (1956) (Comment to 
fanner § 1.08 at pp. 37-38.) 
